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Vael Gates's project links to lots of example transcripts of persuading senior AI capabilities researchers.
Codex / Github Copilot are AIs that use GPT-3 to write and edit code. When given some input code and comments describing the intended function, they will write output that extends the prompt as accurately as possible.
"The real concern" isn't a particularly meaningful concept here. Deep learning has proven to be a very powerful technology, with far reaching implications across a number of aspects of human existence. There are significant benefits to be found if we manage the technology properly, but that management means addressing a broad range of concerns, one of which is the alignment problem.
Whole Brain Emulation (WBE) or ‘mind uploading’ is a computer emulation of all the cells and connections in a human brain. So even if the underlying principles of general intelligence prove difficult to discover, we might still emulate an entire human brain and make it run at a million times its normal speed (computer circuits communicate much faster than neurons do). Such a WBE could do more thinking in one second than a normal human can in 31 years. So this would not lead immediately to smarter-than-human intelligence, but it would lead to faster-than-human intelligence. A WBE could be backed up (leading to a kind of immortality), and it could be copied so that hundreds or millions of WBEs could work on separate problems in parallel. If WBEs are created, they may therefore be able to solve scientific problems far more rapidly than ordinary humans, accelerating further technological progress.
The problem is that the actions can be harmful in a very non-obvious, indirect way. It's not at all obvious which actions should be stopped.
For example when the system comes up with a very clever way to acquire resources - this action's safety depends on what it intends to use these resources for.
Such a supervision may buy us some safety, if we find a way to make the system's intentions very transparent.
Until AI doesn't exceed human capabilities, we could do that.
But there is no reason why AI capabilities would stop at the human level. Systems more intelligent than us, could think of several ways to outsmart us, so our best bet is to have them as closely aligned to our values as possible.
Verified accounts are given to people who have clearly demonstrated understanding of AI Safety outside of this project, such as by being employed and vouched for by a major AI Safety organization or by producing high-impact research. Verified accounts may freely mark answers as canonical or not, regardless of how many Stamps the person has, to determine whether those answers are used by Stampy.
This depends on how we will program it. It definitely can be autonomous, even now, we have some autonomous vehicles or flight control systems and many more.
Even though it's possible to build such systems, it may be better if they actively ask humans for supervision, for example in cases where they are uncertain what to do.
It is impossible to design an AI without a goal, because it would do nothing. Therefore, in the sense that designing the AI’s goal is a form of control, it is impossible not to control an AI. This goes for anything that you create. You have to control the design of something at least somewhat in order to create it.
There may be relevant moral questions about our future relationship with possibly sentient machine intelligent, but the priority of the Control Problem finding a way to ensure the survival and well-being of the human species.
Goal-directed behavior arises naturally when systems are trained to on an objective. AI not trained or programmed to do well by some objective function would not be good at anything, and would be useless.
Nobody knows for sure when we will have ASI or if it is even possible. Predictions on AI timelines are notoriously variable, but recent surveys about the arrival of human-level AGI have median dates between 2040 and 2050 although the median for (optimistic) AGI researchers and futurists is in the early 2030s (source). What will happen if/when we are able to build human-level AGI is a point of major contention among experts. One survey asked (mostly) experts to estimate the likelihood that it would take less than 2 or 30 years for a human-level AI to improve to greatly surpass all humans in most professions. Median answers were 10% for "within 2 years" and 75% for "within 30 years". We know little about the limits of intelligence and whether increasing it will follow the law of accelerating or diminishing returns. Of particular interest to the control problem is the fast or hard takeoff scenario. It has been argued that the increase from a relatively harmless level of intelligence to a dangerous vastly superhuman level might be possible in a matter of seconds, minutes or hours: too fast for human controllers to stop it before they know what's happening. Moving from human to superhuman level might be as simple as adding computational resources, and depending on the implementation the AI might be able to quickly absorb large amounts of internet knowledge. Once we have an AI that is better at AGI design than the team that made it, the system could improve itself or create the next generation of even more intelligent AIs (which could then self-improve further or create an even more intelligent generation, and so on). If each generation can improve upon itself by a fixed or increasing percentage per time unit, we would see an exponential increase in intelligence: an intelligence explosion.
Cybersecurity is important because computing systems comprise the backbone of the modern economy. If the security of the internet was compromised, then the economy would suffer a tremendous blow.
Similarly, AI Safety might become important as AI systems begin forming larger and larger parts of the modern economy. As more and more labor gets automated, it becomes more and more important to ensure that that labor is occurring in a safe and robust way.
Before the widespread adoption of computing systems, lack of Cybersecurity didn’t cause much damage. However, it might have been beneficial to start thinking about Cybersecurity problems before the solutions were necessary.
Similarly, since AI systems haven’t been adopted en mass yet, lack of AI Safety isn’t causing harm. However, given that AI systems will become increasingly powerful and increasingly widespread, it might be prudent to try to solve safety problems before a catastrophe occurs.
Additionally, people sometimes think about Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), sometimes called Human-Level Artificial Intelligence (HLAI). One of the core problems in AI Safety is ensuring when AGI gets built, it has human interests at heart. (Note that most surveyed experts think building GI/HLAI is possible, but there is wide disagreement on how soon this might occur).
To help frame this question, we’re going to first answer the dual question of “what is Cybersecurity?”
As a concept, Cybersecurity is the idea that questions like “is this secure?” can meaningfully be asked of computing systems, where “secure” roughly means “is difficult for unauthorized individuals to get access to”. As a problem, Cybersecurity is the set of problems one runs into when trying to design and build secure computing systems. As a field, Cybersecurity is a group of people trying to solve the aforementioned set of problems in robust ways.
As a concept, AI Safety is the idea that questions like “is this safe?” can meaningfully be asked of AI Systems, where “safe” roughly means “does what it’s supposed to do”. As a problem, AI Safety is the set of problems one runs into when trying to design and build AI systems that do what they’re supposed to do. As a field, AI Safety is a group of people trying to solve the aforementioned set of problems in robust ways.
The reason we have a separate field of Cybersecurity is because ensuring the security of the internet and other critical systems is both hard and important. We might want a separate field of AI Safety for similar reasons; we might expect getting powerful AI systems to do what we want to be both hard and important.
These 4 answers have been added in the last month.
Vael Gates's project links to lots of example transcripts of persuading senior AI capabilities researchers.
You can include a live-updating version of many definitions from LW using the syntax on Template:TagDesc in the Answer field and Template:TagDescBrief on the Brief Answer field. Similarly, calling Template:TagDescEAF and Template:TagDescEAFBrief will pull from the EAF tag wiki.
When available this should be used as it reduces the duplication of effort and directs all editors to improving a single high quality source.
There have been surveys and opinion polls done. The most comprehensive one was done by The Future of Humanity Institute, where they surveyed 550 of the top experts in AI research. In this survey, when asked "which year do you think the chance of human level artificial intelligence reaches 50%", the mean response was 2081 and the median response was 2040.
Unless there was a way to cryptographically ensure otherwise, whoever runs the emulation has basically perfect control over their environment and can reset them to any state they were previously in. This opens up the possibility of powerful interrogation and torture of digital people.
Imperfect uploading might lead to damage that causes the EM to suffer while still remaining useful enough to be run for example as a test subject for research. We would also have greater ability to modify digital brains. Edits done for research or economic purposes might cause suffering. See this fictional piece for an exploration of how a world with a lot of EM suffering might look like.
These problems are exacerbated by the likely outcome that digital people can be run much faster than biological humans, so it would be plausibly possible to have an EM run for hundreds of subjective years in minutes or hours without having checks on the wellbeing of the EM in question.
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Talking about full AGI: Fairly likely, but depends on takeoff speed. In a slow takeoff of a misaligned AGI, where it is only weakly superintelligent, manipulating humans would be one of its main options for trying to further its goals for some time. Even in a fast takeoff, it’s plausible that it would at least briefly manipulate humans in order to accelerate its ascent to technological superiority, though depending on what machines are available to hack at the time it may be able to skip this stage.
If the AI's goals include reference to humans it may have reason to continue deceiving us after it attains technological superiority, but will not necessarily do so. How this unfolds would depend on the details of its goals.
Eliezer Yudkowsky gives the example of an AI solving protein folding, then mail-ordering synthesised DNA to a bribed or deceived human with instructions to mix the ingredients in a specific order to create wet nanotechnology.
When one person tells a set of natural language instructions to another person, they are relying on much other information which is already stored in the other person's mind.
If you tell me "don't harm other people," I already have a conception of what harm means and doesn't mean, what people means and doesn't mean, and my own complex moral reasoning for figuring out the edge cases in instances wherein harming people is inevitable or harming someone is necessary for self-defense or the greater good.
All of those complex definitions and systems of decision making are already in our mind, so it's easy to take them for granted. An AI is a mind made from scratch, so programming a goal is not as simple as telling it a natural language command.
Present-day AI algorithms already demand special safety guarantees when they must act in important domains without human oversight, particularly when they or their environment can change over time:
Achieving these gains [from autonomous systems] will depend on development of entirely new methods for enabling “trust in autonomy” through verification and validation (V&V) of the near-infinite state systems that result from high levels of [adaptability] and autonomy. In effect, the number of possible input states that such systems can be presented with is so large that not only is it impossible to test all of them directly, it is not even feasible to test more than an insignificantly small fraction of them. Development of such systems is thus inherently unverifiable by today’s methods, and as a result their operation in all but comparatively trivial applications is uncertifiable.
It is possible to develop systems having high levels of autonomy, but it is the lack of suitable V&V methods that prevents all but relatively low levels of autonomy from being certified for use.
- Office of the US Air Force Chief Scientist (2010). Technology Horizons: A Vision for Air Force Science and Technology 2010-30.
As AI capabilities improve, it will become easier to give AI systems greater autonomy, flexibility, and control; and there will be increasingly large incentives to make use of these new possibilities. The potential for AI systems to become more general, in particular, will make it difficult to establish safety guarantees: reliable regularities during testing may not always hold post-testing.
The largest and most lasting changes in human welfare have come from scientific and technological innovation — which in turn comes from our intelligence. In the long run, then, much of AI’s significance comes from its potential to automate and enhance progress in science and technology. The creation of smarter-than-human AI brings with it the basic risks and benefits of intellectual progress itself, at digital speeds.
As AI agents become more capable, it becomes more important (and more difficult) to analyze and verify their decisions and goals. Stuart Russell writes:
The primary concern is not spooky emergent consciousness but simply the ability to make high-quality decisions. Here, quality refers to the expected outcome utility of actions taken, where the utility function is, presumably, specified by the human designer. Now we have a problem:
- The utility function may not be perfectly aligned with the values of the human race, which are (at best) very difficult to pin down.
- Any sufficiently capable intelligent system will prefer to ensure its own continued existence and to acquire physical and computational resources – not for their own sake, but to succeed in its assigned task.
A system that is optimizing a function of n variables, where the objective depends on a subset of size k<n, will often set the remaining unconstrained variables to extreme values; if one of those unconstrained variables is actually something we care about, the solution found may be highly undesirable. This is essentially the old story of the genie in the lamp, or the sorcerer’s apprentice, or King Midas: you get exactly what you ask for, not what you want.
Bostrom’s “The Superintelligent Will” lays out these two concerns in more detail: that we may not correctly specify our actual goals in programming smarter-than-human AI systems, and that most agents optimizing for a misspecified goal will have incentives to treat humans adversarially, as potential threats or obstacles to achieving the agent’s goal.
If the goals of human and AI agents are not well-aligned, the more knowledgeable and technologically capable agent may use force to get what it wants, as has occurred in many conflicts between human communities. Having noticed this class of concerns in advance, we have an opportunity to reduce risk from this default scenario by directing research toward aligning artificial decision-makers’ interests with our own.
Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments.
This is a bit vague, but serves as the working definition of ‘intelligence’. For a more in-depth exploration, see Efficient Cross-Domain Optimization.
- Wikipedia, Intelligence
- Neisser et al., Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns
- Wasserman & Zentall (eds.), Comparative Cognition: Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence
- Legg, Definitions of Intelligence
After reviewing extensive literature on the subject, Legg and Hutter summarizes the many possible valuable definitions in the informal statement “Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of environments.” They then show this definition can be mathematically formalized given reasonable mathematical definitions of its terms. They use Solomonoff induction - a formalization of Occam's razor - to construct an universal artificial intelligence with a embedded utility function which assigns less utility to those actions based on theories with higher complexity. They argue this final formalization is a valid, meaningful, informative, general, unbiased, fundamental, objective, universal and practical definition of intelligence.
We can relate Legg and Hutter's definition with the concept of optimization. According to Eliezer Yudkowsky intelligence is efficient cross-domain optimization. It measures an agent's capacity for efficient cross-domain optimization of the world according to the agent’s preferences. Optimization measures not only the capacity to achieve the desired goal but also is inversely proportional to the amount of resources used. It’s the ability to steer the future so it hits that small target of desired outcomes in the large space of all possible outcomes, using fewer resources as possible. For example, when Deep Blue defeated Kasparov, it was able to hit that small possible outcome where it made the right order of moves given Kasparov’s moves from the very large set of all possible moves. In that domain, it was more optimal than Kasparov. However, Kasparov would have defeated Deep Blue in almost any other relevant domain, and hence, he is considered more intelligent.
One could cast this definition in a possible world vocabulary, intelligence is:
- the ability to precisely realize one of the members of a small set of possible future worlds that have a higher preference over the vast set of all other possible worlds with lower preference; while
- using fewer resources than the other alternatives paths for getting there; and in the
- most diverse domains as possible.
How many more worlds have a higher preference then the one realized by the agent, less intelligent he is. How many more worlds have a lower preference than the one realized by the agent, more intelligent he is. (Or: How much smaller is the set of worlds at least as preferable as the one realized, more intelligent the agent is). How much less paths for realizing the desired world using fewer resources than those spent by the agent, more intelligent he is. And finally, in how many more domains the agent can be more efficiently optimal, more intelligent he is. Restating it, the intelligence of an agent is directly proportional to:
- (a) the numbers of worlds with lower preference than the one realized,
- (b) how much smaller is the set of paths more efficient than the one taken by the agent and
- (c) how more wider are the domains where the agent can effectively realize his preferences;
and it is, accordingly, inversely proportional to:
- (d) the numbers of world with higher preference than the one realized,
- (e) how much bigger is the set of paths more efficient than the one taken by the agent and
- (f) how much more narrow are the domains where the agent can efficiently realize his preferences.
This definition avoids several problems common in many others definitions, especially it avoids anthropomorphizing intelligence.
The major AI companies are thinking about this. OpenAI was founded specifically with the intention to counter risks from superintelligence, many people at Google, DeepMind, and other organizations are convinced by the arguments and few genuinely oppose work in the field (though some claim it’s premature). For example, the paper Concrete Problems in AI Safety was a collaboration between researchers at Google Brain, Stanford, Berkeley, and OpenAI.
However, the vast majority of the effort these organizations put forwards is towards capabilities research, rather than safety.